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Does 2 + 3 = 5?  In defence of a near absurdity
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Mary Leng (Department of Philosophy, University of York) 
 
James Robert ƌŽǁŶĂƐŬƐ ? “/ƐĂŶǇŽŶĞƌĞĂůůǇĂŐŶŽƐƚŝĐĂďŽƵƚ ?A? ?A? ? ?ĂŶĚǁŝůůŝŶŐŽŶůǇƚŽŐŝǀĞĂƐƐĞŶƚ
to PA Æ  ?A? ?A? ? ? ? (where PA stands for the Peano axioms for arithmetic).   In fact Brown should 
ƋƵĂůŝĨǇŚŝƐ ‘ĂŶǇŽŶĞ ?ǁŝƚŚ ‘ĂŶǇŽŶĞŶŽƚĂůƌĞĂĚǇŚŽƉĞůĞƐƐůǇĐŽƌƌƵƉƚĞĚďǇƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ?ƐŝŶĐĞ, as he 
knows full well, there are plenty of so-called nominalist philosophers  W myself included  W who, 
wishing to avoid commitment to abstract (that is, non-spatiotemporal, acausal, mind- and language-
independent) objects, take precisely this attitude to mathematical claims.   
 
tŚǇŽŶĞĂƌƚŚŵŝŐŚƚŽŶĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƵĐŚĂďĂƐŝĐĐůĂŝŵĂƐ ‘ ?A? ?A? ? ? ?&ŝƌƐƚŽĨĂůů ?ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĐůĞĂƌ
about what is not being questioned.  That two apples plus three more apples makes five apples is 
ŶŽƚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƐŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚŶĞŝƚŚĞƌŝƐƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝǌĞĚǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐ ? ‘&ŽƌĂŶǇ& ?ŝĨthere 
are two Fs, and three more Fs, then there are ĨŝǀĞ&Ɛ ? ?KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞƚŚŝƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŵĂǇĨĂŝůĨŽr 
some Fs (think of rabbits or raindrops), but suitably qualified so that we only plug in the right kind of 
predicates ĂƐƌĞƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚƐĨŽƌ ‘& ?, this generalization will not worry nominalist philosophers of 
mathematics  W indeed, each of its instances are straightforward logical truths expressible and 
derivable in first-order predicate logic, without any mention of numbers at all. 
 
ƵƚŝƐŶ ?ƚƚŚŝƐǁŚĂƚ ‘ ?A? ?A? ? ?ƌĞĂůůǇsays? That any two things combined with any three more 
(combined in the right kind of way so that no things are created or destroyed in the process) will 
make five things?  If we only ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ‘ ?A? ?A? ? ?ĂƐĂƋƵŝĐŬǁĂǇŽĨǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůĐůĂŝŵŽĨƚŚĞ
latter sort, then again nominalist philosophers of mathematics would not worry.
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  Ƶƚ ‘ ?A?  ?A? ? ?ĂƐĂ
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 Indeed, it is because of the relation of provable-in-WĐůĂŝŵƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ ? ?A? ? ?A? ? ? ?A? ? ?A? ? ?A? ? ? ? ? ?A㴀  ? ?A   ?A   A㴀 
 ? ? ? ?ĂďďƌĞǀŝĂƚĞĚ ?ŽŶĐĞƐƵŝƚĂďůĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŝŶƉůĂĐĞ ?ƚŽ ‘ ?A㴀  ?A䄀  ? ? ? ?ƚŽƚƌƵĞůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇƚƌƵĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐƐƵĐŚ
ĂƐ ‘ĂŶǇƚǁŽƚŚŝŶŐƐĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŶǇƚŚƌĞĞŽƚŚĞƌƚŚŝŶŐƐŵĂŬĞĨŝǀĞƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ƚŚĂƚǁĞĂƌĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞWĞĂŶŽ
axioms in the first place.  A mathematical Platonist  W i.e., a defender of the view that mathematics consists in a 
body of truths about abstract mathematical objects - ŵŝŐŚƚƐĂǇƚŚĂƚ ?ĨĂƌĨƌŽŵďĞůŝĞǀŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?A㴀  ?A䄀  ? ?ŽŶƚŚĞ
basis of its following from the Peano axioms, we come to see that the Peano axioms correctly characterize the 
ŶĂƚƵƌĂůŶƵŵďĞƌƐŽŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŝŵƉůǇŝŶŐĐůĂŝŵƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?A㴀  ? A? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚǁĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇŬŶŽǁƚŽ
be true of the natural numbers (something like this line of thinking is suggested by Russell (1924, p. 325), who 
ƉŽŝŶƚƐŽƵƚƚŚĂƚ “tŚĞŶƉƵƌĞŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐƐŝƐŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚĂƐĂĚĞĚƵĐƚŝǀĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ? ?^ŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƌĞŵŝƐĞƐĂƌĞŵƵĐŚ
less ŽďǀŝŽƵƐƚŚĂŶƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚĂƌĞďĞůŝĞǀĞĚĐŚŝĞĨůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ? ? ?dŚĞ
ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐůŝŶĞŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐŝƐŝŶĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?ƐŝŶĐĞǁĞĚŽŶŽƚŬŶŽǁ ‘ ?A㴀  ?A䄀  ? ?ƚŽďĞƚƌƵĞŽĨ
numbers considered as mathematical objects (since we do not know that there are any such objects).  
mathematical claim is more than a mere abbreviation of a generalization about counting.  This can 
be seen in the fact that it has logical consequences that are not consequences of the generalisation 
to which it relates.  It follows logically fƌŽŵ ‘ ?A? ?A? ? ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŶŽďũĞĐƚ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚ ĂĚĚĞĚ
ƚŽƚŚƌĞĞŵĂŬĞƐ ? ?ŶĚƚŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚĂůŽŐŝĐĂůĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůĐůĂŝŵ ‘&ŽƌĂŶǇ& ?ŝĨƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ
ƚǁŽ&Ɛ ?ĂŶĚƚŚƌĞĞŵŽƌĞ&Ɛ ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĨŝǀĞ&Ɛ ? ?&ŽƌƚŚŝƐ general claim can be true in finite domains 
consisting entirely of physical objects, with no numbers in them at all.  Since nominalist philosophers 
question whether there are any numbers (on the grounds that, were there to be such things they 
would have to be abstract  W nonspatiotemporal, acausal, mind- and language-independent  W to 
serve as appropriate truthmakers for the claims of standard mathematics), they see fit to question 
claims such as  ‘ ?A? ?A? ? ?ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇŝŵƉůǇƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨŽďũĞĐƚƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ
number 2, which, they take it, may fail to exist (as in our finite domain example) even though the 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĐůĂŝŵ ‘ĂŶǇƚǁŽƚŚŝŶŐƐĂĚĚĞĚƚŽĂŶǇƚŚƌĞĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƚŚŝŶŐƐŵĂŬĞĨŝǀĞƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ŝƐƚƌƵĞ ? 
 
Some philosophers  W inspired by the philosopher/logician Gottlob Frege  W try to rule out such finite 
domains by arguing that the existence of the natural numbers is a consequence of an analytic (or 
conceptual) truth, this truth being the claim that, effectively, if the members of two collections can 
be paired off with one another exactly, then they share the same number: 
 ‘ĨŽƌĂŶǇ& ĂŶĚ' ?ƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ&ƐA?ƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ'ƐŝĨĂŶĚŽŶůǇŝĨ&A?' ? 
 ?ǁŚĞƌĞ ‘&A?' ? ŝƐƐŚŽƌƚĨŽƌ ‘ƚŚĞ&ƐĂŶĚ'ƐĐĂŶďĞƉƵƚŝŶƚŽŽŶĞ-ŽŶĞĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞ ? ? ?dŚŝƐĐůĂŝŵ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
ŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ ‘,ƵŵĞ ?ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ? ?ƐŝŶĐĞ&ƌĞŐĞĨŝƌƐƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĐŝƚŝŶŐŝƚƐ
ŽĐĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞŝŶŽŽŬ ?ŽĨĂǀŝĚ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐTreatise of Human Nature (1738)), is argued to be analytic of 
our concept of number since anyone who grasps the concept of number will grasp the truth of this 
claim.   
 
^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨŶƵŵďĞƌƐĨĂůůƐĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇŽƵƚŽĨ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?ŝĨ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŝƐƉĂƌƚŽĨ
our concept of number then it follows from this that anyone who grasps that concept thereby grasps 
that numbers exist.  This derivation of the existence of numbers from our concept of number is 
ƌĞŵŝŶŝƐĐĞŶƚŽĨ^ƚŶƐĞůŵ ?ƐŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ĚĞƌŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨ'ŽĚĨƌŽŵŽƵƌĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ
God as ĂďĞŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĂŶǁŚŝĐŚŶŽŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĐĂŶďĞĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚ ?. (SƵĐŚĂďĞŝŶŐĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚĞǆŝƐƚmerely in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Nevertheless, we can mirror this reasoning from an anti-Platonist perspective to provide a justification for PA 
over other candidate axiom systems: we choose to work on this system, and are interested in what follows 
from its axioms, in no small part because of the relation of its quantifier-free theorems to logical truths such as 
ƚŚĞƚƌƵƚŚƚŚĂƚ ‘&ŽƌĂŶǇ& ?ŝĨƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƚǁŽ&Ɛ ?ĂŶĚƚŚƌĞĞŵŽƌĞ&Ɛ ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĨŝǀĞ&Ɛ ? ?
imagination, Anselm argues, because if we can conceive of God at all then we can also conceive of 
Him existing in reality.  And since existing in reality is greater than existing merely in the imagination, 
if God existed only in the imagination, we could conceive of something even greater  W a really 
existing God  W ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŶŐŽƵƌĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ'ŽĚĂƐĂďĞŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĂŶǁŚŝĐŚŶŽŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĐĂŶďĞ
ĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚ ?.)  &ŽƌŶŽŵŝŶĂůŝƐƚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞ&ƌĞŐĞĂŶƐ ?ĚĞƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨŶƵŵďĞƌƐĨƌŽŵ
our concept of number is at least as fishy as this supposed derivation of the existence of God from 
our concept of God.  Since nominalist philosophers take themselves to have a concept of number 
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚďĞůŝĞǀŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨŶƵŵďĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞǇǁŝůůƌĞũĞĐƚ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞas a conceptual 
truth, belieǀŝŶŐŽŶůǇƚŚĂƚ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐWƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƐŽƵƌĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨŶƵŵďĞƌŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚ ?in 
order for any objects to count as satisfying that concept ?ƚŚĞŶ,ƵŵĞ ?ƐWƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞ
true of them, while remaining agnostic on the question of whether there are in fact any numbers. 
 
But why remain agnostic about whether there are numbers?   And what even hinges on this?  
Mathematicians talk about mathematical objects and mathematical truths all the time, and indeed 
are able to prove ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůƚŚĞŽƌĞŵƐĂƌĞƚƌƵĞ ?/ƐŶ ?ƚŝƚĂďƐƵƌĚŝŶƚŚĞĨĂĐĞŽĨĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ
ŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƚŽƐĂǇ ? ‘/ŬŶŽǁǇŽƵthink ǇŽƵ ?ǀĞƉƌŽǀĞĚ&ĞƌŵĂƚ ?Ɛ>ĂƐƚdŚĞŽƌĞŵ ?Prof Wiles, 
but actually since we have no reason to believe there are any numbers, we have no reason to 
ďĞůŝĞǀĞ&>d ? (Actually, the situation is even worse than that: if there are no numbers then FLT is 
trivially true since, it follow a fortiori that there are no numbers n >2 such that x
n
 + y
n
 = z
n ?ƐŽtŝůĞƐ ?
efforts were truly wasted.)  The philosopher David Lewis certainly thought it would be absurd for 
philosophers to question the truth of mathematical claims.  As he puts it, 
Mathematics is an established, going concern.  Philosophy is as shaky as can be.  To reject 
ŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐƐĨŽƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůƌĞĂƐŽŶƐǁŽƵůĚďĞĂďƐƵƌĚ ? ? 
 dŚĂƚ ?ƐŶŽƚĂŶĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?/ŬŶŽǁ ?ZĂƚŚĞƌ ?/ĂŵŵŽǀĞĚƚŽůĂƵŐŚƚĞƌĂƚƚŚĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŽĨ
how presumptuous it would be to reject mathematics for philosophical reasons.  How would 
you like the job of telling the mathematicians that they must change their ways, and abjure 
countless errors, now that philosophy has discovered that there are no classes? Can you tell 
them, with a straight face, to follow philosophical argument wherever it may lead? If they 
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞǇŽƵƌĐƌĞĚĞŶƚŝĂůƐ ?ǁŝůůǇŽƵďŽĂƐƚŽĨƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ƐŽƚŚĞƌŐƌĞĂƚĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌŝĞƐ PƚŚĂƚ
motion is impossible, that a Being than which no greater can be conceived cannot be 
conceived not to exist, that it is unthinkable that there is anything outside the mind, that 
time is unreal, that no theory has ever been made at all probable by the evidence (but on 
the other hand that an empirically ideal theory cannot possibly be false), that it is a wide-
open scientific question whether anyone has ever believed anything, and so on, and on, ad 
nauseum? 
 Not me! (Lewis 1990: 58-9) 
Just to put this in some perspective, David Lewis is the philosopher best known for believing that, for 
ĞǀĞƌǇƚƌƵĞĐůĂŝŵĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚ ?ƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?such as,  ‘ƉŽƐƐŝďůǇ ?dƌƵŵƉǁŝůůǁŝŶ ? ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂǁŽƌůĚjust like 
our own in respect of its reality (i.e., physical, concrete, though spatiotemporally inaccessible to us) 
at which that claim is actual (i.e., at that world, there is a counterpart to our own Donald Trump, 
who becomes PresidenƚŽĨƚŚĂƚǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉĂƌƚƚŽŽƵƌh^ ? ?3  If a philosophical view is so absurd 
that even David Lewis ĐĂŶ ?ƚƐƚŽŵĂĐŚŝƚ ?ƚŚĞŶŵĂǇďĞŝƚ ?ƐƚŝŵĞƚŽƌĞƚŚŝŶŬ ? 
 
Well if nominalist philosophers are going to find mathematics wanting in the way Lewis suggests 
(calling on mathematicians to renounce their errors and change their practices), and indeed if as 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚĂďŽǀĞƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽŚĂǀĞƚŽĚŝƐŵŝƐƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƌĞƐƵůƚƐƐƵĐŚĂƐtŝůĞƐ ?ƐƉƌŽŽĨ ?ƚŚĞŶ they 
probably do deserve to be laughed out of town.  But contemporary nominalists typically wish to 
ůĞĂǀĞŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐƐũƵƐƚĂƐŝƚŝƐ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŶŽŵŝŶĂůŝƐƚƐĐĂŶĞǀĞŶƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐŝĂŶƐ ?ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ
concerning the truth of their theories and the existence of mathematical objects, in at least this 
sense: there is a notion of truth internal to mathematics according to which to be true 
mathematically just is to be an axiom or a logical consequence of accepted (minimally, logically 
possible  W or coherent) mathematical axioms, and to exist mathematically just is to be said to exist in 
an accepted (minimally, logically possible) mathematical theory.   Thus in expressing his puzzlement 
ŽǀĞƌ&ƌĞŐĞ ?Ɛ account of axioms in mathematics as truths that are true of an intuitively grasped 
subject matter, David Hilbert writes in response to a letter from Frege: 
zŽƵǁƌŝƚĞ P ‘ ?&ƌŽŵƚŚĞƚƌƵƚŚŽĨƚŚĞĂǆŝŽŵƐŝƚĨŽůůŽǁƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĚŽŶŽƚĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽŶĞ
ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?/ĨŽund it very interesting to read this very sentence in your letter.  For as long as I 
have been thinking and writing on these things, I have been saying the exact reverse: if the 
arbitrarily given axioms do not contradict each other in all their consequences, then they are 
true and the things defined by the axioms exist. This is for me the criterion of truth and 
existence. (Hilbert, letter to Frege, 1899 (reprinted in Frege (1980)) 
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 Typically, in preƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ>ĞǁŝƐ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞĂƉƉĞĂůƚŽŽŶĞŽĨŚŝƐŽǁŶĐŽůŽƵƌĨƵůĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ?ĨƌŽŵ>ĞǁŝƐ
1986) of a merely possible but nevertheless improbable and in fact non-actual world, for example, a world in 
which there are talking donkeys.  At time of writing (March 2016), I thought I would pick an alternative 
possible but surely similarly improbable (and thus pretty likely to be non-actual) scenario, one in which Donald 
dƌƵŵƉďĞĐŽŵĞƐWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?>ĞǁŝƐ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŚĂƐĂƐĂĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůŽƵƚĐŽŵĞŽf the 
 ? ? ? ?ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁŽƵůĚďĞƐŽŵĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞǁŽƌůĚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚdƌƵŵƉǁŽŶŝƚ ?tŚĂƚ/ǁĂƐŶ ?ƚďĂŶŬŝŶŐŽŶǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ
that world would turn out to have been our own. 
 If by truth in mathematics we just mean  ‘ĂǆŝŽŵŽƌůŽŐŝĐĂůĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŽĨĂcoherent ĂǆŝŽŵƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?
and if ďǇĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŝŶŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐƐǁĞũƵƐƚŵĞĂŶ ‘ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ claim that follows logically from the 
assumption of a coherent ĂǆŝŽŵƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?ƚŚĞŶĂŐĂŝŶƚŚĞŶŽŵŝŶĂůŝƐƚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌǁŝůůŶŽƚďĂƵůŬĂƚƚŚĞ
mathematical truth of the theorems of standard mathematics, or the mathematical existence claims 
that follow from these theorems.  Mathematicians are welcome to the truth of their theorems, and 
the existence of mathematical objects, in this sense.
4
 
 
But then what is it that nominalist philosophers do baulk at.  In what sense of truth and existence do 
they wish to say that we have no reason to believe that the claims of standard mathematics are true, 
or that their objects exist? If we agree that 2 + 3 = 5 is true in this Hilbertian sense (of being a 
consequence of coherent axioms), and also true in a practical applied sense (when understood as 
shorthand for a generalization about what you get when you combine some things and some other 
things), then what is the nominalist worrying about when she worries whether this sentence is really 
true, or whether its objects really ĞǆŝƐƚ ?dŚĞŝƐƐƵĞĂƌŝƐĞƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞďĞŝŶŐƚƌƵĞ ‘ŝŶƚŚĞ,ŝůďĞƌƚŝĂŶƐĞŶƐĞ ?
is not always enough.  At least outside of pure mathematics, the mere internal coherence of a 
framework of beliefs is not enough to count those beliefs as true.  Perhaps the notion of an 
omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being is coherent, in the sense that the existence of such a 
being is at least logically possible, but most would think that there remains a further question as to 
whether there really is a being satisfying that description.  And, in more down to earth matters, 
Newtonian gravitational theory is internally coherent, but we now no longer believe it to be a true 
account of reality.  Granted this general distinction between the mere internal coherence of a theory 
and its truth, the question arises as to whether we ever have to take our mathematical theories as 
more than merely coherent  W as getting things right about an independently given subject matter.  
To answer this, we need to understand how we do mathematics  W how mathematical theories are 
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 dŚŽƐĞĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌǁŝƚŚ,ŝůďĞƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁŝůůŬŶŽǁƚŚĂƚ ?ŝŶŚŝƐĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞǁŝƚŚ&ƌĞŐĞ ?,ŝůďĞƌƚwould have 
assumed a syntactic notion of logical consequence, so strictly speaking his criterion of truth and existence was 
deductive consistency (so that an axiomatic theory would be true, mathematically speaking, if no contradiction 
could be derived from ƚŚŽƐĞĂǆŝŽŵƐ ? ?/ŶůŝŐŚƚŽĨ'ƂĚĞů ?ƐŝŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞŶĞƐƐƚŚĞŽƌ ŵƐ ?ǁĞŶŽǁŬŶŽǁƚŚĂƚŝĨǁĞ
take the second-order Peano axioms (with the full second-order induction axiom, rather than a first-order 
axiom scheme), and conjoin with this the negation of the Gödel sentence for this theory (defined in relation to 
a particular derivation system for it), no contradiction will be derivable from this theory, but nevertheless the 
theory has no model (in the standard second-order semantics). The syntactic notion of deductive consistency 
thus comes apart (in second-order logic) from the semantic notion of logically possibly true.  I have used 
^ƚĞǁĂƌƚ^ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇŽĨ ‘ĐŽŚĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽ ‘ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐǇ ?ƚŽŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƚŚŝƐƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐ
notion of logically possible truth. This notion is adequately modelled in mathematics by the model theoretic 
notion of satisfiability, though I take the lesson of Georg Kreisel (1967) to be that the intuitive notion of 
logically possible truth is neither model theoretic nor proof theoretic (though adequately modelled by the 
model theoretic notion).  
developed and applied  W and ask whether anything in those practices requires us to say that 
mathematics is true in anything more than what I have been calling the Hilbertian sense.
5
 
 
It is here where recent debate in the philosophy of mathematics has turned its attention to the role 
of mathematics in empirical scientific theorizing.  Of course even in unapplied mathematics, mere 
coherence ŝƐŶ ?ƚĞŶŽƵŐŚ ?6  Mathematicians are concerned with developing mathematically 
interesting theories, axiom systems that are not merely coherent but which capture intuitive 
concepts, or have mathematically fruitful consequences.  But accounting for the role of these further 
desiderata does not seem to require that we think of our mathematical theories in the way the 
Platonist does as answerable to how things really are with a realm of mathematical objects (even if 
there were such objects, what grounds would we have for thinking that the truths about them 
shŽƵůĚďĞŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐ ?ĨƌƵŝƚĨƵů ? ? ? ?tŚĞŶǁĞturn to the role of mathematics in science we 
have at least a prima facie case for taking more than the mere logical possibility of our applied 
mathematical theories to be confirmed.  In particular, close attention has been played to the alleged 
explanatory role played by mathematical entities in science.  We believe in unobservable theoretical 
objects such as electrons in part because they feature in the best explanations of observed 
phenomena: if we explain the appearance of a track in a cloud chamber as having been caused by an 
ĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶ ?ďƵƚŐŽŽŶƚŽĂĚĚ ‘ďƵƚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚďĞůŝĞǀĞŝŶĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶƐ ? ?ǁĞƐĞĞŵƚŽƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞŽƵƌĐůĂŝŵƚŽŚĂǀĞ
explained the phenomenon of the track.  The same, say many Platonist philosophers of 
mathematics, goes for mathematical objects such as numbers.  If we explain the length of cicada 
periods (Baker 2005, see alsŽDĂƌŬŽůǇǀĂŶ ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚƉĂƉĞƌŝŶƚŚŝƐũŽƵƌŶĂů ?as the optimal adaptive 
ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ‘ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ?ĂƌĞƉƌŝŵĞŶƵŵďĞƌƐ ? ?ďƵƚƚŚĞŶŐŽŽ ƚŽĂĚĚ ? ‘ďƵƚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚďĞůŝĞǀĞŝŶ
ŶƵŵďĞƌƐ ? ?ĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĞƐŝŵŝůĂƌůǇƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶǁĞ ŚĂǀĞƚƌŝĞĚƚŽŐŝǀĞ ?KŶďĞŚĂůĨŽĨthe 
nominalist side in this debate, I have argued elsewhere that while mathematics is playing an 
explanatory role in such cases, it is not mathematical objects that are doing the explanatory work.  
Rather, such explanations, properly understood, are structural explanations: they explain by showing 
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 It is worth noting that Hilbert did not stick with his position that non-contradictoriness is all that is required 
for truth in mathematics, choosing in his later work to interpret the claims of finitary arithmetic as literal truths 
about finite strings of strokes (thus straying from his original position which saw axioms as implicit definitions 
of mathematical concepts, potentially applicable to multiple systems of objects). This later, also Hilbertian, 
sense of truth (truth when interpreted as claims about syntactic objects), is not the one I wish to advocate in 
this discussion. 
 
6
 /ƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ?ŝŶƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ŵĞƌĞ ?ĐŽŚĞƌĞŶĐ ?/ĚŽŶŽƚŵĞĂŶƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
logical possibility of an axiom system is a trivial matter. Substantial work goes into providing relative 
consistency proofs, and of course the consistency  W and so, a fortiori coherence  W of base theories such as ZFC 
is something about which there is active debate. 
(a) what would be true in any system of objects satisfying our structure-characterizing mathematical 
axioms, and (b) that a given physical system satisfies (or approximately satisfies) those axioms.  It is 
because the (axiomatically characterised) natural number structure is instantiated in the succession 
of summers starting from some first summer at which cicadas appear that the theorem about the 
optimum period lengths to avoid overlapping with other periods being prime applies.  But making 
use of this explanation does not require any abstract mathematical objects satisfying the Peano 
axioms, but only that they are true (at least approximately  W idealizing somewhat to paper over the 
fact of the eventual destruction of the Earth) when interpreted as about the succession of summers. 
 
The debate over whether the truth of mathematics, and the existence of mathematical objects (over 
and above the Hilbert-truth and Hilbert-existence that comes with mere coherence) is confirmed by 
the role of mathematics in empirical science rumbles on.  But note that whatever philosophers of 
science conclude about this issue, it does not impinge on mathematicians continuing to do 
mathematics as they like, and indeed continuing to make assertions about the (Hilbert)-truth of their 
theorems and the (Hilbert)-existence of their objects.  Nominalists will claim that Hilbert-truth and 
Hilbert-existence is all that matters when it comes to mathematics, and in this sense it is perfectly 
fine to agree that 2 + 3 = 5 (since this is a logical consequence of the Peano Axioms).  And they will 
agree that this particular axiom system is of particular interest to us because of the relation of its 
formally provable claims to logically true generalizations ( ‘/ĨǇŽƵŚĂǀĞƚǁŽƚŚŝŶŐƐĂŶĚƚŚƌĞĞŵŽƌĞ
ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ƚŚĞŶǇŽƵŚĂǀĞĨŝǀĞƚŚŝŶŐƐ ? ? ?ƵƚƚŽƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚ ŚĂƚ it is the more-than-mere-coherence literal 
truth of mathematics as a body of claims about a domain of abstract objects that philosophers are 
concerned about, while nominalists may worry whether we have any reason to believe that 
mathematical claims are true in that sense ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐŝĂŶƐĐĂŶďĞŚĂƉƉǇǁŝƚŚZƵƐƐĞůů ?Ɛ
ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐƐĂƐ “the subject in which we never know what we are talking about, nor 
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌǁŚĂƚǁĞĂƌĞƐĂǇŝŶŐŝƐƚƌƵĞ ? (Russell (1910), 58).  
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